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@article{Rikap2022,

title = {Becoming an intellectual monopoly by relying on the national innovation system: the State Grid Corporation of China's experience},

author = {Cecilia Rikap},

url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004873332100264X},

doi = {10.1016/j.respol.2021.104472},

issn = {0048-7333},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-05-01},

urldate = {2022-05-01},

journal = {Research Policy},

volume = {51},

number = {4},

pages = {104472},

abstract = {This paper examines the origins of global leaders under intellectual monopoly capitalism. State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), the leading firm in artificial intelligence applications for the energy sector, became an intellectual monopoly relying heavily on China's national innovation system –particularly public research organizations and public funding, and innovation and energy policies. SGCC is unique because it did not rely on technology transfer from global leaders, unlike other national champions from developing or emerging countries. We provide evidence that contributes to thinking that SGCC first became a national intellectual monopoly and only afterwards expanded that monopoly globally. We empirically study SGCC's innovation networks. We proxy them using big data techniques to analyze the content, co-authors and co-owners of its publications and patents. Results also suggest that SGCC is capturing intellectual rents from its increasingly transnational and technologically diverse innovation networks by leveraging its national innovation system.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Rikap2020b,

title = {Who collects intellectual rents from knowledge and innovation hubs? questioning the sustainability of the singapore model},

author = {Cecilia Rikap and David Flacher},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2020.06.004},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-12-01},

urldate = {2020-12-01},

journal = {Structural Change and Economic Dynamics},

volume = {55},

pages = {59-73},

abstract = {While knowledge and innovation are produced in networks involving diverse actors, associated rents are greatly appropriated by global leaders, mostly coming from core countries, that become intellectual monopolies. This raises the question on emerging or peripheral countries companies’ capacity to catch-up, innovate and compete for intellectual rents. The article considers the case of Singapore who has pursued a knowledge hub strategy aimed at: 1) creating world class universities inserted in global knowledge networks of defined fields; and 2) capturing intellectual rents through those institutions’ research and contributing to local firms’ catching up. We show that research universities caught-up. However, we find that foreign companies, particularly multinationals, capture most of Singapore's intellectual rents at the expense of local companies and research institutions. Overall, our findings point to the limitations of Singapore's knowledge hub as a catching-up strategy. The article ends discussing the relevancy of these findings for emerging countries in general.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Rikap2020,

title = {Amazon: A story of accumulation through intellectual rentiership and predation },

author = {Cecilia Rikap},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529420932418},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-06-17},

journal = {Competition & Change},

abstract = {This article elaborates on intellectual monopoly theory as a form of predation and rentiership using Amazon as a case study. By analysing Amazon’s financial statements, scientific publications and patents, we show that Amazon’s economic power heavily relies on its systematic innovations and capacity to centralize and analyse customized data that orients its business and innovations. We demonstrate how Amazon’s innovation activities have evolved over time with growing importance of technologies related to data and machine learning. We also map Amazon’s innovation networks with academic institutions and companies. We show how Amazon appropriates intellectual rents from these networks and from technological cooperation with other intellectual monopolies. We argue that Amazon, as other data-driven monopolies, predates value from suppliers and third-party companies participating in its platform. One striking characteristic of Amazon is the low rate of reported profits. The centrality of innovations leads us to suggest an alternative calculation that shows that Amazon’s profits are not as low as they appear in Annual Reports. We also argue that lower profits are coherent with Amazon’s rentiership and predatory strategy since they contribute to the avoidance of accusations of excessive market power. Finally, the paper offers preliminary observations on: (i) the complementarities between financial and intellectual rentierism and (ii) how data-driven intellectual monopoly expands big corporations’ political power. Going beyond the specific case of Amazon, we thus contribute to a better understanding of the role of lead firms and power dynamics within innovation networks.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}